Airo Health was a Canadian-American wearable health startup that attempted, twice, to build a passive biometric tracking device—and failed both times. Founded in 2013 by three University of Waterloo engineering graduates, the company first launched a wristband claiming to track nutrition via spectroscopy, drew immediate expert skepticism, and cancelled pre-orders within a month. After three years of rebuilding, the team pivoted to passive stress and mental health tracking, earned a spot in Y Combinator's Summer 2016 batch, and briefly attracted attention at Demo Day. But with only $125,000 in total lifetime funding, a two-person team, and no documented post-YC raise, the company quietly ceased operations. The core thesis of failure is straightforward: Airo launched hardware built on scientifically unproven technology with no working prototype in 2013, and then could not secure the capital or team scale needed to ship a validated product in its second act.
Airo Health traces its origins to the University of Waterloo's engineering program, where Naman Kumar, Emmanuel DeVries, and Abhilash Jayakumar met and graduated together. Waterloo's co-op engineering culture—which routinely produces hardware and health-tech founders—provided both the technical grounding and the entrepreneurial context for the team's early ambitions. [1]
The company was incorporated in early 2013 as Blacktree Fitness Technologies Inc., based in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario. [2] The founding insight was behavioral rather than purely technical: the team believed that people failed to improve their health not because they lacked data, but because they lacked clear, actionable next steps. As co-founder Abhilash Jayakumar put it at launch: "There are so many things happening in one's life, that if you don't know what to do next, you won't do it." [3]
The original product concept was a pure stress monitor targeting hypertension and heart disease. After early customer conversations, however, the team concluded that users were not interested in a single-function device. [4] This led to the first of several pivots: the team expanded the concept into a multi-function wristband that would track nutrition, stress, exercise, and sleep simultaneously—what Jayakumar called "the four pillars of health." [5]
The ambition was genuine. Jayakumar articulated a vision that anticipated the behavioral health platforms that would emerge years later: "We built AIRO to help people become more proactive about their health. By aggregating data around the four pillars of health, AIRO notices patterns in your behavior and tells you what you can do, each day, to live a healthier life." [5]
The team secured $85,000 in Canadian and Waterloo grants as initial funding—no outside investors, no venture capital. [6] With that capital and a concept but no working prototype, they went public in October 2013.

By 2016, the team had changed substantially. Abhilash Jayakumar had departed—the timing and circumstances are not documented publicly. Emmanuel DeVries' role also became unclear. Maryam Jahed joined as co-founder and Product Manager, bringing a digital health product background that would later take her to Woebot, Carbon Health, and Midday. [7] The company relocated to Sunnyvale and then San Francisco, California, and applied to Y Combinator. [8]
Early 2013 — Airo Health founded by Naman Kumar, Emmanuel DeVries, and Abhilash Jayakumar; incorporated as Blacktree Fitness Technologies Inc. in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario. $85,000 in Canadian/Waterloo grants secured. [6]
2013 (pre-launch) — Company pivots from a pure stress monitor to a multi-function wristband after customer feedback. [4]
October 28, 2013 — Airo publicly launches its wristband concept. Pre-orders open at $149 (planned retail $199), targeting 1,000–5,000 units with a planned ship date of Fall 2014. No working prototype, no app, no investors exist at launch. Coverage in Engadget, TechCrunch, AllThingsD, and BetaKit. [9]
November 22, 2013 — Airo cancels all pre-orders and refunds early backers, citing lack of market proof and need for further testing and calibration. [10]
2013–2016 — Company rebuilds in relative obscurity. Abhilash Jayakumar departs at an undocumented date. Product pivots to passive stress and mental health tracking via HRV. Company relocates to California.
2016 — Maryam Jahed joins as co-founder and Product Manager. [11] Company accepted into Y Combinator Summer 2016 (S16) batch. [8]
August 22–23, 2016 — Airo Health presents at YC S16 Demo Day, pitching automatic calorie intake tracking via a $200 wearable. Named one of the 10 most remarkable startups at Demo Day 1 by Futurism. Seed round of $125,000 recorded. [12] [13]
Post-August 2016 — No post-YC funding round documented. Company ceases operations at an undetermined date. PitchBook records status as "Out of Business"; YCDB records status as "Dead." [14] [15]
The original AIRO wristband was a wide aluminum cuff designed to be worn continuously on the wrist. Its central claim was that a built-in spectrometer—a sensor that shines light at different wavelengths through the skin—could detect the signatures of metabolites in the wearer's bloodstream and infer what they had eaten, including calories, carbohydrates, protein, and fat. [16]
Beyond nutrition, the device was designed to track three additional health dimensions: stress (via heart rate variability), physical exercise, and sleep quality. The companion app would aggregate all four data streams and surface personalized recommendations—telling users not just what was happening with their health, but what to do about it. The planned retail price was $199, with a pre-order price of $149. [9]

The device was described in prototype form as "wide silver plastic cuffs with a layer of soft padding underneath," with the production version planned as a unibody bead-blasted aluminum cuff. The team planned an initial production run of 1,000 to 5,000 units, with a ship date of Fall 2014. [9]
What made AIRO different from competitors like Fitbit and Jawbone was the nutrition-tracking claim. No consumer wearable had attempted passive, continuous dietary monitoring before. The proposition was genuinely novel: users would not need to log meals, count calories, or change any behavior. The device would simply know.
The problem was that this claim had no working proof. At the time of the public launch, the team had no working prototype, no companion app, and no investors. [6]

After the 2013 collapse, the team rebuilt around a more scientifically defensible core. The YC-era product was an armband—not a wristband—that focused exclusively on passive stress and mental health tracking. [17]
The device measured heart rate variability (HRV) at 500 samples per second, a medical-grade sampling rate that the company cited as the basis for accurate autonomic nervous system monitoring. The scientific foundation was explicitly grounded in 40 years of HRV research, a deliberate contrast with the speculative spectroscopy claims of 2013. Battery life was 14 hours, and the device synced wirelessly to iPhone 5+ and Android 5+ via Bluetooth Low Energy. [18]
The user experience was designed to be passive. The armband would continuously monitor the wearer's nervous system, calculate a stress level, and alert the user when stress was rising. The companion app would then recommend built-in exercises—breathing techniques, short meditations—to relieve stress in the moment. [17]

The pivot was substantive. The team had stripped away the scientifically questionable nutrition-tracking feature and rebuilt around a sensor modality—optical HRV—that had genuine clinical backing. The product was priced at $200 and positioned as a mental health tool rather than a fitness tracker, targeting a market that was just beginning to attract serious attention in 2016.
Whether the device was ever shipped to paying customers is not documented in any available source.
The 2013 product targeted health-conscious consumers who wanted a single device to replace manual food logging, fitness tracking, and sleep monitoring. The implicit customer was someone already engaged with quantified-self tools—Fitbit users, MyFitnessPal users—who found manual data entry burdensome.
The 2016 product shifted the target customer meaningfully. The stress-tracking armband was positioned for people experiencing chronic stress, with the mental health framing suggesting a customer who might otherwise use meditation apps (Headspace launched in 2012, Calm in 2012) or seek clinical support. The YC company description—"an AI to passively track and manage your mental health"—pointed toward a broader mental wellness consumer rather than a clinical patient population. [8]
The consumer wearables market was growing rapidly in both 2013 and 2016. Fitbit went public in June 2015 at a $4.1 billion valuation, validating the consumer appetite for wrist-worn health devices. The mental health and wellness app market was also expanding: the global mental health app market was estimated at approximately $587 million in 2018 and growing at double-digit rates.
The specific niche Airo occupied in 2016—passive, continuous stress monitoring via a dedicated wearable—was less clearly defined. Apple Watch had launched in April 2015 and was beginning to incorporate health monitoring features. The competitive question was not whether the market existed, but whether a standalone stress-monitoring wearable could carve out a durable position against general-purpose smartwatches with expanding health feature sets.
In 2013, the direct competition was the first generation of activity trackers: Fitbit, Jawbone UP, and Nike FuelBand. None of these devices claimed to track nutrition passively, which was Airo's primary differentiator. The indirect competition was manual food logging apps like MyFitnessPal, which had 40 million users by 2013. Airo's value proposition was explicitly positioned against the friction of manual logging.
By 2016, the competitive landscape had shifted substantially. Apple Watch dominated premium wearables. Fitbit had gone public. Garmin and Polar offered HRV-capable devices targeting athletes. In the stress-specific category, companies like Spire (a clip-on breathing monitor, founded 2013) and Muse (an EEG headband for meditation, founded 2012) had established earlier footholds. Empatica's E4 wristband offered medical-grade physiological monitoring, though at a research price point.
The mental health app market was also crowding. Headspace and Calm were scaling rapidly. Woebot, the AI mental health chatbot that Airo's own Maryam Jahed would later help navigate through FDA, launched in 2017. The broader trend was toward software-first mental health tools with lower capital requirements and faster iteration cycles—a structural disadvantage for a hardware-dependent company like Airo.
Airo's business model in both eras was hardware-first: sell a physical device at a consumer price point and, presumably, layer software or subscription services on top.
In 2013, the device was priced at $149 (pre-order) and $199 (retail). [9] No subscription or data monetization model was publicly described.
In 2016, the YC-era device was priced at $200. [12] The company's website described a companion app with built-in stress-relief exercises, suggesting a potential software layer, but no subscription pricing was documented publicly.
Hardware-first business models carry high capital requirements: tooling, manufacturing, supply chain, quality assurance, and returns all require cash before a single unit generates revenue. For a two-person team with $125,000 in total lifetime funding, [19] the unit economics of hardware production were almost certainly unworkable without a significant post-YC raise. No such raise is documented.
Airo Health failed twice, for overlapping but distinct reasons. The 2013 failure was primarily a technology credibility problem. The 2016 failure was primarily a capital and scale problem. Together, they illustrate how a company can correct one fatal flaw and still be undone by the next.
The most immediate cause of Airo's first collapse was launching a pre-order campaign for a device whose central technical claim—that a wrist-worn optical sensor could infer caloric and macronutrient intake from blood metabolite signatures—had no working demonstration.
At the time of the October 28, 2013 launch, the team had no working prototype, no companion app, and no investors. [6] The AllThingsD article covering the launch was headlined with the word "theoretically." Expert reaction was swift and negative: a clinical dietitian quoted in press coverage called the nutrient analysis "highly questionable at best." The Hacker News discussion of the launch generated significant skepticism from the technical community.
The company's attempted remedy was to proceed with the pre-order campaign anyway, presumably hoping that commercial demand would validate the concept and fund further development. This is a recognizable pattern in hardware startups—using pre-order revenue as a proxy for product-market fit—but it requires that the underlying technology be at least demonstrably feasible. In Airo's case, it was not.
Within less than a month, on November 22, 2013, the company cancelled all pre-orders and refunded backers. The company's own written acknowledgment to customers was unambiguous: "we received immediate feedback from the market that we lacked the proof that a product like AIRO will work as advertised." [10] The company cited the need for further testing and calibration, but no subsequent evidence emerged that the spectroscopic nutrition-tracking technology was ever validated.
The number of pre-orders received and the amount of revenue collected and refunded are not publicly documented.
The second failure was structural. By 2016, the team had made a scientifically defensible pivot—abandoning the unproven spectrometer nutrition claims and rebuilding around HRV-based stress monitoring, a modality with genuine clinical backing. [18] The YC acceptance validated the concept. The Demo Day visibility was real: Futurism named Airo one of the 10 most remarkable startups at Demo Day 1. [13]
But the capital base was catastrophically thin for a hardware company. Total lifetime funding was $125,000 across two rounds, with investors including Y Combinator, FundersClub, FCVC, and Creative Destruction Lab. [19] The $125,000 figure almost certainly represents the standard YC deal of the era ($120,000 for 7%), with minimal additional capital from other investors. For context, hardware startups routinely require $1–5 million to reach a manufacturable product, cover tooling costs, and fund an initial production run.

No post-YC funding round is documented in PitchBook, Tracxn, or Crunchbase. The company appears to have been unable to convert Demo Day visibility into a meaningful seed raise. Whether this was due to investor skepticism about the hardware category, the team's prior 2013 failure, the two-person team size, or some combination is not documented in any available source.
The YC-era team was two people: Naman Kumar and Maryam Jahed. [20] Building, manufacturing, and commercializing a consumer hardware device with a two-person team is extraordinarily difficult under any funding conditions. Hardware development requires simultaneous progress on industrial design, embedded firmware, mobile app development, supply chain management, regulatory compliance, and customer support. Each of these workstreams typically requires dedicated personnel.
The team's attempt to address this constraint is not documented. It is possible they planned to hire aggressively post-Demo Day, contingent on a successful raise. If so, the failure to raise made the team constraint permanent.
By mid-2016, the standalone stress-monitoring wearable market was being absorbed by general-purpose smartwatches. Apple Watch Series 2 launched in September 2016, one month after Airo's Demo Day. Fitbit's Charge 2, which introduced HRV-based stress tracking via its "Relax" feature, also launched in September 2016. Both devices offered stress monitoring as one feature among many, at price points ($199–$349) comparable to Airo's $200 device, with the backing of companies with hundreds of millions in capital.
A two-person startup with $125,000 in funding could not compete on hardware features, distribution, or brand recognition against Apple and Fitbit simultaneously entering its core market segment. The specific technology gap that would have protected Airo—medical-grade 500 samples-per-second HRV sampling versus the consumer-grade sampling in Apple Watch and Fitbit—was a real differentiator, but one that required clinical validation and a clinical sales channel to monetize. Neither was achievable at Airo's funding level.
It is worth noting what the team did correctly, even in failure. In 2013, they refunded pre-orders rather than shipping an unproven product—a decision that protected customers and preserved the team's credibility for a second attempt. The three-year pivot to HRV-based stress monitoring was scientifically sound. The YC acceptance confirmed that the revised concept had genuine merit. And the team's domain expertise was real: Maryam Jahed went on to lead Woebot through FDA, then became Director of Product at Carbon Health, and later Head of Product at Midday. [7] The insight that motivated Airo—that passive, continuous monitoring could replace burdensome manual health tracking—has since been validated by the broader digital health market. The company simply could not execute it at the scale required.
Launching hardware pre-orders without a working prototype is a credibility-destroying gamble, not a validation strategy. Airo's October 2013 launch generated significant press coverage but collapsed within a month when the company could not demonstrate that its core technology worked. The pre-order cancellation cost the company time, momentum, and the trust of early adopters. Hardware startups need a working proof-of-concept before going public, not after.
A scientifically sound pivot does not automatically solve a capital problem. Airo's 2016 product was built on defensible science—40 years of HRV research—and earned genuine recognition at YC Demo Day. But the pivot did not address the fundamental mismatch between hardware development costs and the company's $125,000 funding base. Fixing the product thesis without fixing the capital structure left the company unable to ship. [19]
Hardware startups entering a market segment occupied by Apple and Fitbit need a defensible distribution moat, not just a better sensor. Airo's 500 samples-per-second HRV sampling was technically superior to what Apple Watch and Fitbit offered in 2016. But technical superiority alone does not win consumer hardware markets. A clinical channel, an enterprise wellness buyer, or a specific patient population with unmet needs would have provided a distribution path that avoided direct competition with trillion-dollar companies. [18]
The behavioral insight behind Airo was correct; the execution vehicle was wrong. Abhilash Jayakumar's observation—"if you don't know what to do next, you won't do it"—anticipated the core value proposition of digital mental health platforms that have since raised hundreds of millions of dollars. [3] The insight was sound. A software-first or hybrid approach might have allowed the team to validate the behavioral model before committing to the capital-intensive hardware path.
Domain expertise survives company failure. The most durable output of Airo Health was not a product but a team with genuine expertise in passive health monitoring and digital mental health. Maryam Jahed's subsequent career—Woebot, Carbon Health, Midday—demonstrates that the knowledge built at Airo had real value, even when the company could not capture it commercially. [7]