Zigfu was a Y Combinator-backed startup that built developer tools for gesture-controlled applications using Microsoft Kinect and other motion sensors. Founded in 2011 by four co-founders including MIT-educated CEO Amir Hirsch[1], the company promised to take developers "from zero to working motion apps in a couple minutes"[2] through simplified development kits and distribution tools.
Zigfu failed because it was too early to market with gesture-controlled interfaces, lacking the ecosystem maturity and consumer adoption needed to sustain a developer tools business in the nascent motion-sensing market. Despite strong technical credentials—two founders were former PrimeSense engineers with deep Kinect expertise[3]—the company is now permanently closed[4], a casualty of betting on a technology wave that never fully materialized for consumer applications.
Zigfu was founded in 2011 by Amir Hirsch, Shlomo Zippel, Ted Blackman, and Roee Shenberg[1]. The founding team brought impressive technical credentials to the motion-sensing space. CEO Amir Hirsch held three degrees from MIT in math and electrical engineering[5], while two of the co-founders were former engineers at PrimeSense, the Israeli firm from which Microsoft licensed technology to power the Xbox Kinect[3].
This insider knowledge of Kinect technology positioned the team uniquely to build developer tools in the emerging motion-sensing market. The company was headquartered in San Francisco[6] and was accepted into Y Combinator's Summer 2011 batch[7], indicating strong initial validation from one of Silicon Valley's premier accelerators.
Zigfu developed comprehensive developer tools for creating gesture-controlled applications using Microsoft Kinect and other motion tracking sensors[11]. The core product was the Zigfu Development Kit for Kinect, which allowed users to create motion-controlled 3D games for the Kinect platform[12].
The company's key innovation was simplifying the notoriously complex setup process for motion-sensing development. Their OpenNI installer allowed developers to set up development environments in one click, bundling OpenNI, NITE, and SensorKinect and configuring them automatically[13]. This addressed a major pain point, as Hirsch noted it took about two minutes of click-and-drag work to get a motion-controlled avatar up and running[14].
Beyond development tools, Zigfu also provided a gesture-controlled portal and app store for developers to distribute their games[15]. The platform supported both Microsoft Kinect and ASUS Xtion depth sensors[16], giving developers hardware flexibility.
Zigfu positioned itself as the developer tools layer for the emerging motion-sensing market, targeting game developers and creators of gesture-controlled applications. The company built on top of existing hardware platforms—primarily Microsoft Kinect and ASUS Xtion—rather than developing proprietary sensors.
We could not find detailed information about direct competitors or market positioning relative to other developer tool providers in the motion-sensing space during this period.
Zigfu monetized through developer licenses, charging $200 for the .99b version with free upgrades for all 1.X releases[10]. This represented a traditional software licensing model targeting professional developers and small studios working on motion-controlled applications.
We could not find information about unit economics, conversion rates from free signups to paid licenses, or revenue figures.
By August 2011, Zigfu had achieved over 100 developer signups[8] for their development tools. However, we could not find information about conversion rates to paid customers, revenue growth, or other key metrics that would indicate sustainable traction.
The early developer interest suggested validation of the core problem—that motion-sensing development was too complex—but the limited public information makes it difficult to assess whether this translated into a viable business.
Zigfu is now permanently closed and described as "deadpooled"[4][17]. We could not find any public statements from the founders explaining the reasons for failure or providing a detailed post-mortem analysis.
After Zigfu's closure, CEO Amir Hirsch went on to found Flybrix, which created LEGO drone kits[18], suggesting he remained interested in hardware-software integration but pivoted to a different market.
The lack of detailed failure analysis from the founders limits our understanding of the specific factors that led to Zigfu's demise, though the broader context suggests market timing and adoption challenges.
1. Developer tools need thriving end-user markets: Zigfu's failure highlights that developer tools companies are dependent on healthy end-user adoption of the underlying technology. Without widespread consumer adoption of gesture-controlled interfaces, the market for development tools remained limited.
2. Being early can be as dangerous as being late: Despite strong technical execution and founder expertise, Zigfu was likely too early to market. The motion-sensing wave that seemed promising in 2011 never achieved mainstream adoption beyond gaming consoles.
3. Hardware dependency creates additional risk: Building developer tools on top of third-party hardware platforms (Kinect, Xtion) meant Zigfu's success was tied to decisions made by hardware manufacturers and broader market acceptance of those devices.
4. Technical credentials don't guarantee market success: The team's impressive background—including former PrimeSense engineers and MIT-educated leadership—wasn't sufficient to overcome fundamental market timing and adoption challenges.
5. Simplifying complex developer experiences has value but needs scale: While Zigfu successfully addressed real developer pain points around motion-sensing setup complexity, the limited market size meant this value couldn't translate into sustainable revenue.