Posterous was a blogging platform founded in 2008 that pioneered "dead simple" content publishing through email. Users could create blog posts by simply sending an email to post@posterous.com, with the platform automatically formatting and publishing the content[1]. Despite growing to 15 million users by 2011[2], Posterous was acquired by Twitter in March 2012 as an acqui-hire and subsequently shut down in April 2013[3][4].
Posterous failed not due to product-market fit issues or competitive pressures, but because Twitter prioritized talent acquisition over product integration. The company had achieved meaningful scale and user adoption, making it a cautionary tale about the risks of selling to larger platforms that may not share your product vision.
Posterous was founded in May 2008 by three Stanford alumni: Sachin Agarwal, Garry Tan, and Brett Gibson[5][6]. The founding team brought complementary technical backgrounds—Agarwal had spent six years as a senior software engineer on Apple's Final Cut Pro team[7], while Tan worked as a program manager at Microsoft's Windows Mobile division on ActiveSync[8].
The idea originated with Agarwal, who built an initial prototype before recruiting his Stanford Phi Kappa Psi fraternity brother Tan[9][10]. The two had been friends since 2000, providing a strong foundation for their partnership[11].
Posterous launched through Y Combinator's Summer 2008 batch[12], giving the San Francisco-based startup[13] early validation and mentorship during the crucial early stages.
Posterous's core innovation was its "dead simple" email-to-blog functionality[24]. Users could create blog posts by sending an email to post@posterous.com, with the platform automatically parsing attachments, formatting content, and publishing it as a blog post[25]. This eliminated the friction of traditional blogging platforms that required users to log in, navigate complex interfaces, and manually format their content.
The platform went beyond simple email publishing by supporting integrated and automatic posting to other social media platforms including Flickr, Twitter, and Facebook[26]. This cross-platform syndication made Posterous an early hub for social media management, allowing users to maintain a presence across multiple networks from a single email.
In September 2011, Posterous introduced Posterous Spaces[27], an evolution of the platform that expanded beyond individual blogging to group collaboration and content sharing. This represented an attempt to broaden the platform's appeal and use cases beyond personal blogging.
Posterous positioned itself in the crowded blogging market by focusing on simplicity and accessibility. While platforms like WordPress offered extensive customization and Blogger provided Google integration, Posterous differentiated through its email-first approach that eliminated traditional barriers to content creation.
The platform competed primarily with Tumblr in the "simple blogging" space, though each took different approaches—Tumblr focused on visual content and social discovery, while Posterous emphasized email-based publishing and cross-platform syndication. Posterous also competed with traditional blogging platforms like WordPress.com and Blogger, positioning itself as the solution for users who found those platforms too complex.
The email-to-blog functionality appealed particularly to mobile users and those who preferred email workflows over web interfaces. This positioning proved prescient as mobile content creation became increasingly important, though Posterous was ultimately unable to capitalize on this trend.
We could not find detailed information about Posterous's revenue model or pricing structure. The platform appeared to operate as a free service during most of its existence, likely following the typical venture-backed model of prioritizing user growth over immediate monetization.
The lack of a clear revenue model may have contributed to the company's willingness to accept Twitter's acquisition offer, as building sustainable revenue streams for blogging platforms has historically proven challenging without premium features or advertising.
Posterous achieved significant scale, growing to approximately 15 million users by 2011[28]. At its peak in September 2011, the platform had 15 million monthly unique visitors[29], demonstrating substantial user engagement and content creation activity.
However, the platform experienced a dramatic decline in traffic following the Twitter acquisition. By the time of the shutdown announcement in February 2013, Posterous had fallen to just 1.33 million monthly visitors[30]—a 91% decline from its peak. This precipitous drop suggests that uncertainty about the platform's future and lack of active development significantly impacted user retention.
The user base decline likely reflected both natural churn and users migrating to alternative platforms once Twitter's acquisition intentions became clear. The dramatic traffic loss between acquisition and shutdown illustrates how acquisition uncertainty can devastate user-generated content platforms.
Posterous was acquired by Twitter on March 12, 2012, in what was characterized as an acqui-hire with undisclosed financial terms[31][32]. The acquisition came at a time when Posterous had achieved meaningful scale but may have been struggling with monetization and competition.
Nearly a year later, on February 15, 2013, Twitter announced that Posterous would shut down on April 30, 2013[33][34]. The shutdown was justified as necessary to "focus 100% of efforts on Twitter"[35].
The timing suggests that Twitter acquired Posterous primarily for its talent rather than its product. Key founder Garry Tan had already left Posterous in early 2011 to join Y Combinator[36], potentially weakening the team that Twitter was acquiring. The year-long gap between acquisition and shutdown indicates that Twitter likely attempted some form of integration before ultimately deciding to discontinue the service.
The shutdown represented a classic acqui-hire scenario where a larger company acquires a startup primarily for its engineering talent, with little intention of maintaining or developing the acquired product. This approach allowed Twitter to bring experienced engineers onto its team while eliminating a potential competitor in the social content space.
Email-first interfaces can create powerful differentiation. Posterous's core innovation—publishing via email—eliminated friction that plagued traditional blogging platforms. This approach anticipated the mobile-first world where email interfaces often provide better user experiences than web forms. Modern founders should consider how email-based workflows might simplify complex processes in their domains.
Acqui-hires can be existential risks for user-generated content platforms. Posterous's 15 million users lost their content and platform when Twitter prioritized talent over product integration. Founders building platforms with user-generated content should carefully evaluate acquisition offers from companies that may not share their product vision, as users become collateral damage in talent acquisitions.
Timing the market matters more than perfect execution. Posterous launched during the early days of social media when cross-platform publishing was genuinely valuable. However, as platforms like Facebook and Twitter developed their own publishing tools and APIs, Posterous's value proposition diminished. Founders should regularly reassess whether market evolution is strengthening or weakening their core differentiation.
Founder departures can signal deeper issues. Garry Tan's departure to Y Combinator in 2011—just one year before the Twitter acquisition—may have indicated internal challenges or strategic disagreements. When co-founders leave successful startups for other opportunities, it often reflects concerns about the company's direction or growth prospects that aren't immediately visible to outsiders.
Free platforms need clear monetization paths. Posterous's apparent lack of revenue model made it vulnerable to acquisition by companies with different strategic priorities. Platforms that rely entirely on venture funding without clear paths to profitability risk losing control of their destiny when funding markets tighten or strategic acquirers emerge.