Overview

Atrium was a San Francisco-based legal technology company that operated from April 2017 to March 2020. Founded by Justin Kan (Twitch, Y Combinator), Augie Rakow (Orrick partner), Bebe Chueh (AttorneyFee.com), Chris Smoak (AWS, YC alum), and Nick Cortes (McKinsey), it set out to build a "modern law firm for startups" — combining fixed-rate legal services with proprietary software that used machine learning to automate repeatable legal workflows. The company raised $75.5 million across five rounds, including a $65 million Series B from Andreessen Horowitz, and grew to 180 employees and 450+ startup clients before shutting down entirely in March 2020.^[1]

Atrium failed because it was structurally a high-cost professional services business masquerading as a software company. The technology never achieved sufficient operational leverage to offset the economics of maintaining a full in-house legal workforce, and the company scaled headcount and costs far ahead of any validated business model.

The shutdown on March 3, 2020 resulted in layoffs of all 100+ remaining employees and the return of some unspent capital to investors including a16z.^[2] The standalone Atrium law firm continued under partners Michel Narganes and Matthew Melville — a quiet signal that the legal practice itself had value, just not at the scale or margin needed to justify $75 million in venture investment. Kan summarized the outcome bluntly: "My first company sold for a billion dollars. My second one lost $75 million in 36 months."^[3]

Founding Story

Justin Kan arrived at Atrium in 2017 with a résumé that few founders could match. He had co-founded Justin.tv, which evolved into Twitch and sold to Amazon for approximately $970 million in 2014.^[4] He then spent three years as a partner at Y Combinator, advising hundreds of startups, before deciding to build again. The question was what to build.

By his own account, Kan's answer was calculated rather than passionate. "I settled on the concept in the most mercenary way I could think of," he later wrote. "All I wanted was to create the biggest possible company."^[5] He surveyed large, fragmented, technology-resistant industries and landed on legal services — a sector he believed was defensible: "I didn't think it was something that would be as easily competed with."^[6] This mercenary framing would later prove to be one of the company's deepest structural vulnerabilities.

To build credibility in a domain he didn't know, Kan assembled a founding team with genuine legal pedigree. Augie Rakow was a former partner at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, one of Silicon Valley's premier startup law firms, and became managing partner of the law firm entity.^[7] Bebe Chueh was an attorney who had previously co-founded AttorneyFee.com, which sold to LegalZoom in 2014, giving her both legal and legal-tech credibility.^[8] Chris Smoak, a serial entrepreneur and early AWS employee who had previously gone through YC with Gambit Labs, joined as CTO of the technology entity.^[9] Nick Cortes, a former McKinsey analyst and Kan's long-term business partner, handled operations.^[10]

The founding insight was straightforward: startup legal work — fundraising rounds, employment agreements, cap table management — is highly repetitive. If you could map those workflows into software, you could let lawyers focus on judgment rather than document production, deliver faster and cheaper service, and capture the efficiency gains as margin. The vehicle for this was a dual-entity structure: Atrium LLP (the law firm, owned by attorneys) and Atrium LTS (the technology company, which could accept venture investment). Because bar association rules prohibit non-attorneys from owning law firms, Kan — as a non-lawyer — could only hold equity in the tech entity.^[11] This regulatory workaround introduced structural complexity from day one, creating two organizations with partially misaligned incentives that would need to be managed simultaneously.

Atrium raised a $10.5 million Series A from General Catalyst in June 2017 — before any product existed — on the strength of a ten-slide pitch deck and Kan's founder reputation.^[12] The company launched publicly in September 2017 after three months in stealth, and joined Y Combinator's Winter 2018 batch the following January — an unusual move for a company that had already raised a Series A, reflecting Kan's desire to leverage the YC network for client acquisition.^[13]

Timeline

• April 2017 — Atrium founded by Justin Kan, Augie Rakow, Bebe Chueh, Chris Smoak, and Nick Cortes.^[14]
• June 2017 — Raises $10.5M Series A led by General Catalyst, with approximately 97 investors participating, before any product exists.^[15]
• September 2017 — Public launch after three months in stealth. Initial products: Atrium Counsel ($2,000–$10,000/month subscription) and Atrium Financings ($25,000–$45,000 flat-rate fundraising legal service).^[16]
• January 2018 — Joins Y Combinator's Winter 2018 (W18) batch despite having already raised a Series A.^[17]
• June 2018 — Co-founders Chris Smoak (CTO) and Bebe Chueh depart the company, several months before the Series B.^[18]
• Summer 2018 — Acquires Tetra, a YC W17 AI voice/notes startup that had raised $1.5M, to accelerate legal data structuring capabilities.^[19]
• September 2018 — Raises $65M Series B led by Andreessen Horowitz. Company has 110+ employees and 250+ clients who have collectively raised $500M+ in financing. Marc Andreessen joins as board observer; Andrew Chen and Michael Seibel join the board.^[20]
• 2019 — Atrium grows to approximately 180 employees at peak and 450+ client companies. Kan spends approximately six months attempting to solve persistent customer churn without success.^[21]
• January 2020 — Atrium pivots: lays off most attorneys and paralegals, announces shift to focus entirely on a tech platform and "professional services network dedicated to founders."^[22]
• February 21, 2020 — Above the Law reports on the pivot; Clearspire founder Mark Cohen draws structural parallels to prior failed hybrid legal/tech models.^[23]
• March 3, 2020 — Atrium shuts down, laying off all 100+ remaining employees. Some capital returned to investors including a16z.^[24]
• March 5, 2020 — Kan publicly announces the shutdown. Standalone Atrium law firm continues under partners Michel Narganes and Matthew Melville.^[25]
• January 6, 2021 — Kan tweets: "10 months ago we shut down Atrium after raising $75m in venture capital. Anyone hearing that knows I made tons of mistakes along the way."^[26]
• May 17, 2021 — Kan publishes detailed post-mortem via The Quest Pod, attributing failure to co-founder misalignment, leadership shortcomings, and mercenary motivation.^[27]
• May 26, 2021 — Kan tweets: "My first company sold for a billion dollars. My second one lost $75 million in 36 months."^[28]

J

Justinkan@justinkan

My first company @twitch sold for a billion dollars. My second one lost $75 million in 36 months.

2021-05-26

What They Built

Atrium's product vision rested on a single core insight: startup legal work is repetitive enough to be systematized. Fundraising rounds, SAFE agreements, employment contracts, cap table updates — these are not bespoke legal problems requiring creative lawyering. They are structured workflows that follow predictable patterns. If you could encode those patterns into software, you could dramatically reduce the attorney hours required per transaction.

The company built toward this vision through two parallel tracks: a legal services business that generated revenue and client relationships, and a technology platform that was supposed to make that legal services business increasingly efficient over time.

Legal Services Products

At launch in September 2017, Atrium offered two products. Atrium Counsel was a subscription-based ongoing legal service at fixed monthly rates of $2,000 to $10,000, covering a startup's routine legal needs — employment agreements, vendor contracts, equity grants, and general corporate maintenance.^[29] Atrium Financings was a flat-rate service for fundraising transactions, priced at $25,000 to $45,000 per round, covering the full legal process of a seed or Series A financing from term sheet to close.

The fixed-rate model was the product's central differentiating claim. Traditional law firms bill by the hour, creating information asymmetry — clients don't know what they'll pay until the invoice arrives. Atrium's flat rates promised predictability. For a startup CFO managing a tight budget, knowing that a Series A would cost exactly $35,000 in legal fees was genuinely valuable.

The client-facing software platform — the Atrium LTS product — provided a dashboard where startup founders could track the status of their legal matters, access and sign documents, communicate with their legal team, and store their corporate records in one place.^[30] Think of it as a client portal layered on top of a law firm, replacing the email threads and Dropbox folders that typically constitute startup legal record-keeping.

The Technology Layer

Behind the client interface, Atrium LTS was building machine learning infrastructure to ingest legal documents and convert them into structured data.^[31] The goal was to automate the document-heavy, process-driven portions of legal work — drafting standard agreements, flagging non-standard terms, populating cap tables from financing documents — so that attorneys could spend their time on judgment-intensive advising rather than document production.

To accelerate this capability, Atrium acquired Tetra in summer 2018, a YC W17 startup that had built AI for analyzing voice calls and taking structured notes.^[32] The acquisition signaled that Atrium's core ML platform was not yet built to the spec required — the company needed external technology to fill the gap.

Pricing Evolution

The original pricing was later revised downward to a subscription model starting at $500 per month (including unlimited initial legal consultations and platform access) with a deluxe tier at $1,500 per month.^[33] This reduction — from a $2,000–$10,000 monthly range to a $500 base — suggests the original pricing was not finding sufficient market uptake, or that the company was attempting to broaden its addressable market to earlier-stage startups.

The January 2020 Pivot

In January 2020, Atrium attempted to escape the services cost structure entirely by laying off most of its attorneys and paralegals and announcing a pivot to a pure technology platform.^[34] The idea was to become software that connected startups with a network of outside legal professionals, rather than employing those professionals directly. This pivot lasted approximately six weeks before the company shut down entirely — the technology platform was not sufficiently mature to stand alone, and the client relationships had been built on the promise of in-house legal service.

Market Position

Target Customers

Atrium's primary target was early-stage technology startups — companies that had recently incorporated, were raising their first or second venture round, and needed ongoing corporate legal support but lacked the scale to justify a full-time in-house general counsel. The sweet spot was a Series A or Series B company: large enough to have recurring legal needs, small enough that those needs were still largely standardized.

By September 2018, Atrium's client roster included Alto, Bird, MessageBird, and Sift Science — recognizable names in the YC and venture-backed startup ecosystem.^[35] These were not small pre-seed companies; they were funded startups with real legal budgets. The YC network was a natural distribution channel — Kan's relationships from his time as a YC partner gave Atrium immediate access to hundreds of portfolio companies.

Kan later acknowledged a critical failure in customer definition: "Without making the distinction [of who we served], we fell into the pit of trying to be everything to everyone."^[36] As the company grew, it appears to have expanded its target market beyond the core early-stage startup segment without a clear thesis for why different customer segments would have the same needs.

Market Size

The U.S. legal services market generates approximately $300–$350 billion in annual revenue, with corporate legal work representing a substantial portion. The startup legal services segment — the specific niche Atrium targeted — is smaller but concentrated in high-value transactions. A single Series A financing generates $25,000–$75,000 in legal fees at traditional firms; with thousands of venture rounds closed annually, the addressable market for startup-focused legal services runs into the billions.

The broader legal technology market was also growing rapidly during Atrium's operating years, with investment in legal tech startups increasing significantly from 2017 to 2019. The market size thesis was not Atrium's problem — the legal services market is large, fragmented, and genuinely resistant to technology adoption. The problem was whether the specific model Atrium chose could capture that market profitably.

Competition

Atrium competed on two distinct dimensions simultaneously, which complicated its competitive positioning.

On the legal services dimension, Atrium competed with established Silicon Valley law firms — Wilson Sonsini, Cooley, Gunderson Dettmer, Fenwick & West — that had deep relationships with venture capital firms and decades of startup-specific expertise. These firms had a structural advantage Atrium could not easily overcome: deal flow referrals from VCs. When a16z or Sequoia recommends a law firm to a portfolio company, that recommendation carries enormous weight. Atrium's flat-rate pricing was a genuine differentiator, but it was not sufficient to displace relationships built over decades. The incumbents also had a natural response available: they could selectively offer fixed-fee arrangements for standardized transactions without restructuring their entire business model.

On the legal technology dimension, Atrium competed with practice management software companies like Clio (whose CEO Jack Newton was notably an investor in Atrium's Series A), as well as document automation tools like Clerky, which offered automated incorporation and standard startup legal documents at low cost. Clerky in particular occupied the low end of Atrium's market — a startup could incorporate and generate standard financing documents through Clerky for a few hundred dollars, without needing ongoing legal counsel.

The most structurally significant competitive dynamic, however, was not from direct competitors but from the nature of the product itself. Atrium was attempting to build workflow software for lawyers while simultaneously employing those lawyers. The incentive misalignment was inherent: the technology entity's goal was to reduce attorney hours per matter, while the law firm's attorneys had professional and economic incentives to maintain their existing workflows. Kan himself acknowledged this: "The practical reality is that it doesn't work with the nuanced, non-linear workflows that providers already have. So the technology doesn't get adopted and fails to provide value."^[37]

The competitive landscape also included a historical precedent that observers noted at the time of Atrium's January 2020 pivot: Clearspire, a Washington D.C.-based hybrid law firm/tech company that had raised significant capital and shut down in 2014 after failing to achieve operational efficiency. Clearspire founder Mark Cohen drew the parallel explicitly: "I've never known anybody, at least on this side of the Atlantic, who's invested anywhere near $75 million into a small fledgling law firm. The money was clearly invested as a tech play."^[38] Atrium was not the first company to attempt this model, and the prior failure was publicly documented.

Business Model

Atrium's revenue model evolved through at least two distinct phases, neither of which achieved demonstrated profitability.

Phase 1 (2017–2019): Fixed-Rate Legal Services

Revenue came from two products: Atrium Counsel (subscription legal services at $2,000–$10,000/month) and Atrium Financings (flat-rate transaction fees of $25,000–$45,000 per financing round).^[39] The model required that the technology platform reduce attorney hours per matter sufficiently to make fixed-rate pricing profitable. If a financing round required 80 attorney hours at a $300/hour blended cost, the $35,000 flat fee would generate a $11,000 gross margin — but only if the technology actually reduced hours. Without that reduction, the flat-rate model was a race to the bottom.

Atrium never publicly disclosed revenue figures, ARR, or gross margin data. The absence of any revenue disclosure across three years of operation is itself a signal — companies with strong unit economics typically share those metrics with investors and press. At least one client reported believing Atrium was losing money on their account under the flat-rate subscription model, suggesting pricing was set below cost of delivery for at least some customers.^[40]

Burn Rate (Inferred)

With $75.5 million raised and approximately 36 months of operation before shutdown, Atrium's implied average monthly burn was roughly $2 million — though the actual burn likely accelerated after the Series B as headcount grew toward 180 employees. At 180 employees with a mix of attorneys (billing rates of $300–$500/hour equivalent in salary) and engineers in San Francisco, annual payroll costs alone likely exceeded $25–$30 million, implying the company was burning well above the average rate in its peak period. These are inferences from public headcount and location data, not disclosed financials.

Phase 2 (Late 2019): Reduced Subscription Pricing

The shift to a $500/month base subscription suggests an attempt to expand the addressable market and improve retention by lowering the price point. Whether this improved unit economics or simply reduced revenue per customer without reducing service costs is unknown.

Traction

Atrium demonstrated genuine sales traction, particularly in its first two years. By September 2018 — approximately one year after public launch — the company had served more than 250 client companies who had collectively raised over $500 million in primary financing.^[41] By the time of shutdown in March 2020, the client base had grown to more than 450 companies.^[42]

These numbers reflect real market demand for the value proposition — predictable legal pricing for startups — and Kan's personal sales effectiveness within the YC and venture ecosystem. The company grew from zero to 450+ clients in approximately 30 months, a meaningful sales achievement.

The traction numbers also reveal the retention problem. Growing from 250 clients in September 2018 to 450+ clients by early 2020 — an 18-month period — implies net new client additions of roughly 200 over that period. If the company had retained all 250 original clients and added 200 more, the total would be 450. But Kan spent six months in 2019 attempting to solve persistent churn without success.^[43] The implication is that gross client additions were substantially higher than 200, with churn offsetting a significant portion of new sales. The company was filling a leaky bucket — acquiring clients faster than it was losing them, but at a cost structure that made the math unsustainable.

Post-Mortem

Primary Cause: The Services Trap — Funded as Software, Operated as a Law Firm

The central failure of Atrium was a business model contradiction that was present from the first day and never resolved. Venture capital investors — General Catalyst, then Andreessen Horowitz — invested $75.5 million on the thesis that Atrium was a software company that happened to operate a law firm, not a law firm that happened to build software.^[44] Software companies earn high gross margins (70–80%+) and scale without proportional increases in headcount. Law firms earn moderate gross margins (30–50%) and scale by hiring more lawyers.

Atrium's actual cost structure was that of a law firm. By the time of the Series B in September 2018, approximately half of the company's 110+ employees were attorneys and paralegals.^[45] Each new client required proportional legal labor. The technology platform was supposed to change this ratio over time — to let each attorney serve more clients — but it never achieved sufficient automation to move the needle on unit economics.

The flat-rate pricing model made this problem acute. Traditional law firms bill by the hour, which means costs and revenues scale together. Atrium's fixed-rate model capped revenue per matter while costs remained variable with deal complexity. A financing round that took longer than expected, or a client with unusually complex cap table issues, consumed attorney hours that the flat fee did not cover. At least one client reported that Atrium appeared to be losing money on their account.^[46]

Kan acknowledged the core failure directly: "A lot of these companies, Atrium included, did not figure out how to make a dent in operational efficiency."^[47] The technology that was supposed to create that efficiency — the ML platform for structuring legal documents — was not mature enough, fast enough, or adopted widely enough within the attorney workforce to change the economics.

This is also a structural, industry-level failure, not merely an execution failure. The hybrid law firm/tech company model had been attempted before. Clearspire, a Washington D.C.-based predecessor, raised significant capital, built proprietary technology, and shut down in 2014 after failing to achieve operational efficiency.^[48] The pattern — technology investment that cannot overcome the fundamental labor intensity of legal services — is not unique to Atrium. Legal work resists automation at the margins where it matters most: the judgment-intensive, non-linear portions that clients actually pay for.

Secondary Cause: Premature Scaling Before Product-Market Fit

Atrium raised $10.5 million before any product existed and $65 million before it had validated that its technology could actually reduce attorney hours at scale. The capital enabled rapid hiring — 180 employees at peak — which locked in a cost structure that made pivoting expensive and culturally difficult.

Kan was explicit about this mistake: "Hiring too quickly — especially before PMF — can be a fatal mistake. At Atrium, we hired too many people too fast and we failed to set a cohesive culture early. This is incredibly hard to change later on."^[49]

The specific mechanism: when Atrium identified the churn problem in 2019 and needed to iterate on its business model, it was managing 180 employees across two organizational entities (the law firm and the tech company), each with different professional cultures, incentive structures, and regulatory constraints. A five-person startup can change its pricing model in a week. A 180-person organization with a licensed law firm embedded in it cannot.

Kan also acknowledged confusing his personal sales ability with product-market fit: "I confused myself on whether we had PMF because I was really good at sales. Basically, I was really strong and could roll the boulder uphill more easily. But it was still uphill."^[50] The 450+ client companies Atrium acquired were a testament to Kan's network and sales skill, not necessarily to a product that retained customers without founder-level selling effort.

Third Cause: Co-Founder Fracture and Leadership Dysfunction

All four co-founders eventually departed, leaving Kan as the sole remaining founder. CTO Chris Smoak and legal co-founder Bebe Chueh left several months before the September 2018 Series B — meaning Atrium raised $65 million with a fractured founding team.^[51] Kan attributed the departures to role disagreements and personal circumstances, but acknowledged the deeper problem: "Without clearly defined goals between co-founders, huge frictional costs arose."^[52]

The departures had concrete operational consequences. Smoak's exit as CTO left the technology organization without its founding technical leader at a critical moment — the company was about to raise $65 million to build a technology platform, and the person who had been responsible for that platform was gone. Chueh's departure removed the co-founder with the deepest legal-tech domain expertise (having previously built and sold AttorneyFee.com to LegalZoom) at the moment when that expertise was most needed.

Kan's self-described leadership style compounded the cultural damage. "I didn't have a lot of empathy as a manager in the beginning," he said. "It was kind of like either you succeed as an employee... either you're crushing it or you're betraying me."^[53] This binary management style, applied to a 180-person organization that included licensed attorneys with their own professional standards and career expectations, likely accelerated cultural dysfunction.

Fourth Cause: Mercenary Motivation and Insufficient Resilience

Kan's admission that he chose legal services in "the most mercenary way" possible — not from domain passion but from a calculated market-sizing exercise — proved to be a structural weakness when the company encountered serious headwinds.

"Only work on things where you have intrinsic motivation," Kan later wrote. "If you don't, you'll lose motivation when times are hard, or your own goals change."^[54] When Atrium's churn problem became apparent in 2019 and the path forward required grinding through difficult business model iteration, Kan lacked the intrinsic motivation that sustains founders through extended periods of uncertainty. The January 2020 pivot — laying off most attorneys to become a pure tech platform — was attempted and abandoned within approximately six weeks, suggesting that Kan assessed the situation clearly and chose shutdown over a prolonged struggle he did not believe in.

His decision to return remaining capital to investors rather than continue burning toward an uncertain outcome reflects this: "It came down to: do I really think there is a path forward for this business, or am I just making everyone do a fire drill until we reach an inevitable outcome?"^[55]

J

Justinkan@justinkan

10 months ago we shut down Atrium after raising $75m in venture capital. Anyone hearing that knows I made tons of mistakes along the way.

2021-01-06

Key Lessons

• The "full-stack" model requires technology to actually reduce unit costs — not just to exist alongside a services business. Atrium built proprietary software and ran a law firm simultaneously, but the software never achieved sufficient automation to change the ratio of attorney hours per client matter. The flat-rate pricing model assumed the technology would deliver efficiency gains; when it didn't, every client engagement was a potential loss. The lesson is not "don't build full-stack companies" — it is that the technology must demonstrably reduce marginal cost before you price as if it already has. Atrium priced for the future it was building, not the present it was operating in.

• Founder sales ability can mask the absence of product-market fit long enough to raise a $65M Series B. Kan's YC network and personal credibility allowed Atrium to acquire 250+ clients and raise $65 million before the retention problem became undeniable. By the time churn was identified as an unsolvable problem in 2019, the company had 180 employees and a cost structure that made rapid iteration impossible. The signal that should have triggered a business model pivot — customers not renewing — was obscured by Kan's ability to continuously add new customers. Atrium's experience suggests that for founder-led sales in relationship-driven markets, gross client additions are a lagging indicator of PMF; net retention is the leading one.

• Dual-entity structures created to satisfy regulatory constraints introduce misaligned incentives that compound over time. Atrium's separation into Atrium LLP (the law firm) and Atrium LTS (the tech company) was a regulatory necessity, but it created two organizations with fundamentally different goals: the law firm needed profitable legal work, while the tech company needed to automate that work away. This tension was not resolvable through management — it was structural. Companies building in regulated industries where non-practitioners cannot own operating entities should model the incentive misalignment explicitly before scaling, not after.

• Mercenary market selection is a liability when the going gets hard. Kan chose legal services through a calculated market-sizing exercise, not from domain expertise or genuine interest. When Atrium encountered serious headwinds in 2019 — persistent churn, an unproven technology platform, co-founder departures — the mercenary rationale for building the company provided no resilience. Contrast this with founders who build in domains they have lived in: they have the contextual knowledge to iterate faster and the motivation to persist longer. Atrium's experience suggests that for capital-intensive businesses requiring multi-year technology development, founder motivation is not a soft factor — it is a survival variable.

• The hybrid law firm/tech company model has a documented failure pattern that predates Atrium. Clearspire attempted the same structural approach — proprietary technology layered on a law firm — and shut down in 2014. Atrium's investors and founders were aware of this precedent (Clearspire's founder commented publicly on Atrium's pivot). The lesson is not that legal tech is impossible, but that the specific model of employing lawyers while simultaneously trying to automate their work has failed repeatedly. The companies that have succeeded in legal tech (Clio, Ironclad, Clerky) have done so by selling software to law firms or around lawyers, not by trying to replace the law firm from within.

Sources

1. TechCrunch — Atrium Shuts Down (March 3, 2020)
2. Justin Kan on Twitter — May 26, 2021
3. Wikipedia — Justin Kan
4. The Quest Pod — The Story of Atrium (May 17, 2021)
5. TechCrunch — Atrium Legal Series B (September 10, 2018)
6. ABA Journal — Venture-Backed Technology-Focused Law Firm Launches (September 14, 2017)
7. TechCrunch — Justin Kan Atrium $10M General Catalyst (April 12, 2017)
8. YC Companies — Atrium
9. LawNext — Justin Kan's Secretive Legal Startup Debuts (September 14, 2017)
10. Above the Law — $65M Investment in Atrium (September 10, 2018)
11. Chris Chae — The Failed Story of Atrium
12. The Time Blawg — Atrium: A Post-Mortem (March 7, 2020)
13. Above the Law — Atrium Pivots Away from the Shadow of Clearspire (February 21, 2020)
14. Justin Kan on Twitter — January 6, 2021
15. Legal Technology — Atrium Raises $65M (September 11, 2018)
16. Global Legal Post — Don't Build a Services Company (Justin Kan)
17. Technology For You — Twitch Founder Justin Kan on Why Atrium Failed (May 27, 2021)
18. Global Legal Post — Atrium to Close at Loss of 100 Jobs (March 4, 2020)
19. Business of Business — Justin Kan Interview (January 21, 2021)
20. Failory — Atrium Cemetery
21. Crunchbase — Atrium LTS Series B
22. Sunset HQ — Why Did Atrium Fail