Drapr
Summer 2020AcquiredTry on clothing online
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Try on clothing online
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Drapr built a virtual fitting room for apparel retailers. Customers created 3D avatars and tried clothing online. David Pastewka, Will Drevno and Richard Berwick founded the company; YC lists its founding year as 2019 and its batch as Summer 2020. Gap Inc. acquired Drapr on August 26, 2021. This is a documented acquisition, with no established shutdown or failure cause. YC Drapr, Gap announcement.
The company addressed two related questions: how a garment might look on a shopper, and which size would suit that shopper’s body and preference. A visual preview and a reliable sizing decision need different evidence. Gap’s announcement describes intended benefits; it does not disclose a controlled return-rate study or standalone Drapr revenue.
The founders brought prior experience working together on 3D technology. Gap named Boost VC and Berkeley SkyDeck as early supporters. YC describes Drapr as a service apparel brands used to let shoppers try clothing online. The product’s customer was the retailer; its user was a shopper facing uncertainty before purchase. Gap announcement, YC Drapr.
| Date | Observed event |
|---|---|
| 2019 | Founded, per YC |
| Summer 2020 | YC batch |
| August 26, 2021 | Gap acquisition |
| January 28, 2023 | Drapr listed in Gap’s subsidiary schedule |
| Summer 2026 | Founders appear at Marker |
YC Drapr, Gap Form 10-K, YC Marker.
Drapr’s proposed advantage combined avatar-based visualization with size and fit preferences. A shopper could want a looser silhouette even when two garments shared the same label. The product therefore needed to translate body information, garment geometry and personal preference into a useful buying experience. That is a description of the job, rather than proof that Drapr solved every garment or body type.
The available record does not establish Drapr’s complete retailer roster, garment digitization costs, pricing, conversion lift or independently measured returns reduction. Those gaps matter because an attractive preview alone cannot show whether a retailer earned enough incremental margin to pay for it.
The market contains several approaches to the fit problem:
| Approach | Observed current offering | Evidence needed from a new entrant |
|---|---|---|
| Visual try-on | Google generates clothing previews from shopper photos or selected models | Whether the preview supports a physical sizing decision |
| Fit recommendation | True Fit uses purchase, return and keep outcomes to guide size and preference | Accuracy and value against retailer outcomes and existing sizing tools |
| Integrated fitting room | PICTOFiT provides garment/avatar assets, styling, size recommendations and fit visualization | Asset preparation, supported garments and integration costs |
Google try-on, True Fit, PICTOFiT components.
Google’s shopper documentation explicitly says its virtual try-on does not determine or guarantee the actual fit of clothing. That boundary matters for a rebuild: an image can show a plausible appearance without measuring shoulder width, sleeve length, material stretch or comfort. Google Shopping Help.
A useful small product can make a narrower decision inspectable. Start with merchant-reviewed garment measurements, a declared fit preference and a clear explanation of the room between body and garment. Preserve the chart revision and inputs in the shopper’s decision. Missing measurements should block unsupported recommendations. Test actual kept purchases and returns against an agreed baseline before claiming improvement or expanding garment coverage.
Drapr sold a fitting experience to apparel retailers for their shoppers. The observed sources do not establish its price, merchant roster, standalone revenue, total funding or a controlled return-reduction result. A rebuild’s commercial test is whether source-linked sizing decisions improve retailer outcomes enough to pay for the integration. Acquisition consideration and product revenue are different measures.
Gap’s Strategic Growth Office brokered the acquisition. Its announcement framed fit as a customer friction point and connected Drapr to personalized shopping across Gap’s brands. Old Navy’s leadership also connected the technology to its inclusive fit work. The stated purpose was to improve the shopping experience inside an established retail group. Gap announcement.
Gap’s fiscal 2022 Form 10-K confirms the acquisition date. Note 5 groups Drapr with CB4, acquired on October 1, 2021. Their aggregate purchase price was approximately $147 million, including $108 million of goodwill and $39 million of intangible assets. These are combined figures for both acquisitions, not a disclosed Drapr price. The filing says the acquired technology and developed software are amortized over their estimated useful lives. Their results were not material to Gap’s consolidated operations. Gap Form 10-K, Note 5.
The same filing lists Drapr Inc. as a subsidiary as of January 28, 2023. That supports corporate continuity at that date. It does not establish today’s consumer feature availability, a standalone revenue stream or payouts to individual shareholders. Total Drapr funding and its separate acquisition consideration remain unconfirmed in these sources.
YC continues to classify Drapr as acquired. Its founders now appear together at Marker, a Summer 2026 company building enterprise AI systems with forward-deployed engineers. Marker’s own YC launch says the team worked inside Gap after Drapr’s sale and describes that experience as part of the new company’s origin. These are founder accounts of their subsequent work. YC Marker.
Marker is a founder sequel, not an identified continuation of Drapr’s virtual fitting-room product. This research did not establish a current public Gap storefront deployment using Drapr, its coverage across Gap brands or a discontinuation date. Failed website retrieval cannot resolve those questions.
The acquisition’s strategic logic is plausible: an established apparel group controls garment catalogs and shopper distribution, while a small fitting-room vendor must integrate with each retailer. That is an inference about the complementary assets. The record does not prove that integration expense forced the sale, that Drapr ran out of cash or that the acquisition was financially disappointing.