
Wearable computing hardware: biosignal gesture recognition
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North pursued wearable computing through an input device and then smart glasses. Stephen Lake, Matthew Bailey, and Aaron Grant founded Thalmic Labs in 2012 after studying mechatronics at Waterloo. The Winter 2013 YC company made Myo, an armband that translated muscle activity into computer input, before introducing Focals under the North name in October 2018. [1][6]
Google acquired North on June 30, 2020 and said the team would join its Kitchener-Waterloo operation. The team and consumer product had different outcomes: Focals 2.0 was cancelled, and North announced first-generation service closure and refunds. The acquisition terms were not disclosed. [2][11]
Focals required several systems to work together: glasses, a controller, fitting, phone services, and cloud accounts. North reduced some distribution friction through online sizing, but the product still depended on sustained hardware and service support. Its story explains why buying technical capability can preserve a research direction while ending an existing customer's experience.
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Myo and Focals served a consistent ambition through different products. In a 2018 YC interview, the founders described wearables that helped people stay present and focused. They also identified a specific strategic mistake: splitting focus between a new product category and an iteration of an earlier product. They decided to commit to one direction and reshape the company around it. [3]
That account is stronger evidence about the pivot than a general claim that hardware was simply too early. A small company can explore input and display technology, but developing both into consumer products divides management, engineering, and commercial attention. The founders' decision narrowed product focus; it did not eliminate the many dependencies inside the chosen product.
Myo measured electrical muscle activity to control digital devices wirelessly. It was an input peripheral: its value depended on another computing experience accepting those gestures. North's later display product changed that relationship by bringing information into the wearer's view. [1]
Focals projected a private display through a lens. Its Loop ring controlled navigation. The launch feature set included messages, directions, calendar and weather, Amazon Alexa, and Uber requests. These were integrations and advertised functions, not evidence that North controlled every underlying phone service. [6]
Fitting mattered to whether the display was usable. Tom's Hardware's hands-on account describes face scanning, ring sizing, and optician adjustment. Its reviewer saw small images only in the right eye and felt warmth during extended use. These are observations from one hands-on session, not measured failure rates across customers. [12]
North also worked on access to the product. By September 2019, the Focals Showroom app let customers in the U.S. and Canada size and order with an iPhone X or later. Standard Cyborg supplied depth scanning and virtual try-on tools. Glasses shipped with final-adjustment instructions. This moved acquisition beyond North's physical locations without eliminating custom fit. [8][9]
Myo addressed developers and users willing to try a new input method. Focals offered consumers discreet information in eyewear they could use daily. That second job involved comfort, appearance, prescription needs, and social acceptability alongside notifications. An interesting display was only one part of the purchase decision.
In October 2018, the founders reported just under 500 employees. The launch release reported $140 million raised; September 2019's release reported over $170 million. These are dated organization and financing statements, not unit sales, annual revenue, or profit. A complete financing instrument breakdown and audited product economics are not available in these accounts. [3][6][8]
North's April 2019 release said all available appointments on its first three-week tour were filled, including added slots. That is evidence of interest within limited appointment capacity, not proof of broad paid adoption. No consistent shipment, return, retention, or margin series establishes the size of its successful customer base. [7]
Focals had to improve on checking a phone or watch while also functioning as ordinary eyewear. Its discreet display offered a different interaction, but fitting, a charged controller, phone compatibility, and continuing service added dependencies. Those dependencies could limit adoption even when the optics impressed a user.
The current software environment is more developed. Android's December 2025 Preview 3 introduced Jetpack Compose Glimmer, Jetpack Projected, and an AI Glasses emulator simulating touchpad and voice input. May 2026 Preview 4 added display-glasses components and legibility work. Native preview tooling already overlaps a proposed independent design workspace. [13][14]
Google's May 2026 roadmap says audio glasses launch first, with Samsung, Gentle Monster, and Warby Parker. Display eyewear is a separate form factor. A platform announcement therefore does not prove a widespread installed base of display glasses, nor does it establish that North's technology powers a current device. [15]
The launch package cost $999 USD and included glasses, Loop, services, a charging case, and sun clips. By September 2019, North advertised a $599 starting price. Those are different offers at different dates; neither reveals hardware margin after fitting, support, returns, and ongoing services. [6][8]
The company changed distribution as well as price. Pop-up appointments brought fitting to additional cities, while online scanning reduced travel requirements. These changes addressed identifiable barriers, but public announcements do not disclose their effect on conversion or contribution margin. It would be inaccurate to treat the initial two-store model as the company's only route to market. [7][8]
The Google transaction valued a company with technical expertise and a team. Its undisclosed consideration cannot be compared with reported capital raised to calculate investor returns. Customer refunds were separately announced; they are not transaction proceeds or proof of what every buyer ultimately received. [2][11]
The founders' split-focus account explains why the company concentrated on one direction. Focals still combined optical design, user input, custom sizing, commercial distribution, software integrations, and service. Any weak link could interrupt the whole customer experience. The product therefore needed evidence about the entire journey, rather than a successful display demonstration alone.
North's online fitting partnership is an important counterexample to a static distribution diagnosis. The company recognized its limited footprint and changed the process. Yet a remote scan shifted final adjustments toward customers, instead of removing alignment needs. North content designer Carly Gray later described working with opticians on those instructions because incorrect adjustment could put the display outside the user's view. [17]
Google's announcement emphasized North's technical foundation and future hardware work. Contemporary coverage reproduced North's statement that Focals 2.0 would not ship and all paid orders would be refunded. The app and account backend were scheduled to stop July 31, with support continuing through the end of 2020. [2][11]
That sequence shows a service-lifetime risk for connected hardware. The frames could remain physical possessions while the digital functions depended on a backend. A customer buying an integrated device also depends on the provider's commitment to operate services or supply a usable exit path.
Android's common libraries and testing tools now reduce work a glasses application team otherwise has to build itself. That makes a timing explanation plausible: the surrounding ecosystem was less developed during Focals' launch. It cannot prove that later tooling would have made North profitable, or that the same product would succeed today.
The record lacks internal acquisition decisions and complete product economics. Organizational focus, fitting, distribution, interface quality, and service dependence all have evidence; no single one can be assigned a measured share of the outcome. The useful decision is to test each dependency and the customer's continuing experience separately.