Seis
Winter 2022InactiveBanking 100% in Spanish for the 44 million US Spanish speakers
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Banking 100% in Spanish for the 44 million US Spanish speakers
Explore the risks and possibilities with a prompt for ChatGPT, Claude, or your agent.
Seis built a consumer banking app entirely in Spanish for immigrants and other Spanish speakers in the United States. Customers could open an account with an ITIN, passport, consular ID, or Social Security number, receive a Visa debit card, use more than 55,000 surcharge-free ATMs, and later apply for secured or unsecured credit. The product addressed language, documentation, and trust together instead of translating a conventional bank interface.[1][2]
The company demonstrated striking demand. Cofounder Joshua Howland said Seis opened more than 500,000 accounts, reached $10 million in annualized revenue 16 months after launch, and received more than 100,000 five-star app reviews. Eighty percent of its early growth came through word of mouth. Founder Trevor McKendrick says customers eventually spent more than $1.3 billion on Seis cards.[3][4]
That growth did not survive a change in the source of new customers. In January 2026, after almost five years, the founders announced that Seis would shut down because immigration patterns had changed and demand had fallen. The company spent the following months winding down with its bank partners and offered customers a path to move to fellow immigrant-banking service MAJORITY.[3][5][6]
McKendrick had already built for a Spanish-speaking audience. His Spanish Bible app surpassed one million users before Salem Media acquired it in 2015. He later served as chief of staff at Lambda School. His years living in Oaxaca, Mexico, and the experiences of immigrant friends supplied the thesis for Seis. He saw people rejected by financial institutions, charged high fees, or kept outside the system by language, documentation, fear, and mistrust.[2][7]
“They have had many negative experiences with the banking system here, whether it's because of fear, language barriers or cultural differences,” McKendrick told CNN in 2022. “They deserve their own banking and that's why we started Seis.”[8]
McKendrick and Joshua Howland founded the company in 2021. Howland, an experienced product and mobile leader, became cofounder and president. The team made three promises in its initial pitch: operate in Spanish with native-speaking staff, open accounts without requiring an SSN, and provide education and support for the customer's specific circumstances. Seis raised $5 million before its public launch from Y Combinator, Album VC, individual fintech founders, and other investors.[3][7]
Seis was a financial-technology company, not a chartered bank. Thread Bank supplied deposit accounts and issued debit cards; Unit supplied banking infrastructure. Lead Bank issued the Seis Silver credit card. The app owned the customer experience, onboarding, support, product packaging, and community relationship.[1][5]
Account opening took about three minutes and accepted identity documents that many new immigrants possessed. Customers received a US account, debit card, early access to direct deposits, transfers, cash access, and Spanish support. The product presented every workflow in Spanish rather than placing Spanish service behind a phone-menu option.[1][8]
Its later memberships bundled banking and credit. The base tier cost $6 a month or became free after $1,500 in monthly card spend. Plus cost $10, falling to $4 at the same spending threshold, and included a secured credit card. Premium cost $15.95, falling to $9.95, and added benefits such as one free cash deposit, one out-of-network ATM withdrawal, and higher cashback limits. The hybrid credit product could start secured and extend unsecured capacity to qualifying customers, creating a path into mainstream credit.[1][10]
Seis targeted the roughly 44 million people in the United States who spoke Spanish, with special attention to immigrants who lacked an SSN or distrusted conventional banks. Its strongest acquisition loop appears to have been among recent arrivals. Howland recalled customers saying that on a relative's first day in the country, the first instructions were to get a phone and download Seis.[2][3]
The broad need remains substantial but is not identical to Seis's addressable customer flow. The FDIC found that 9.5% of Hispanic households were unbanked in 2023 versus 1.9% of White households; Hispanic households represented 33.4% of all unbanked households. Another 21.7% were underbanked, and 25.5% lacked mainstream credit. These household categories include citizens and long-settled residents as well as immigrants, so they cannot be converted directly into a Seis customer count.[11]
Competitors included immigrant-focused membership apps such as MAJORITY, general neobanks, remittance services, prepaid cards, Cash App, and conventional banks or credit unions with Spanish support. Seis differentiated through full Spanish operation and flexible identity documents. That advantage was real, as its referral rate and app reviews show, but product features were supplied through bank and infrastructure partners that other fintech companies could also hire. Its moat lived in brand, support, and immigrant referrals rather than exclusive financial rails.
Seis combined monthly membership revenue with debit-card interchange and credit economics. Spending could reduce the membership price to zero or a lower tier, which encouraged customers to make Seis their primary card. Cashback and ATM benefits gave higher-priced tiers visible value. The company also depended on contracted banks and processors for regulated products, making partner expense and compliance work part of the unit economics.[1]
The founders reported $10 million in annualized revenue 16 months after launch and more than $500 million in annual debit-card spending at one stage. McKendrick now reports more than $1.3 billion in cumulative card spend. Those numbers show material activity, but Seis did not disclose gross margin, active-account retention, fraud losses, partner fees, customer-acquisition cost, or credit performance.[3][4][5]
Funding is also partly opaque. The founder announced $5 million in 2022. CB Insights reports $18.7 million across five financings, including a $15 million Series A associated with Album VC, but primary financing announcements for that total were not located.[7][9]
Seis's strongest proof was behavioral. It opened more than 500,000 accounts, reached $10 million in annualized revenue within 16 months, and generated 80% of early growth through referrals. Howland said more people used a Seis card each month than could fit in a sold-out football stadium. The app had more than 100,000 five-star reviews across stores; the final App Store listing showed 70,000 ratings and a 4.8 average, while Google Play showed more than 500,000 downloads and 33,000 reviews.[1][3][12]
Y Combinator's profile lists a team size of 70, while Seis's LinkedIn page later displayed an 11–50 range. Neither source supplies a dated headcount series, but both show that the company built a sizable operation for a young consumer fintech.[2][13]
The founders gave a concise causal account. “There's a lot to say here, but the short story is that immigration patterns changed and we saw less demand for our product,” Howland wrote. This matters because Seis's referral engine was tied to newly arrived people telling other new arrivals what to install. A decline in that cohort could impair acquisition faster than the total population of Spanish speakers suggested.[3]
Government data supports the direction of the external change without proving Seis's internal causality. US Border Patrol recorded 8,725 southwest-border crossings in May 2025, 93% below May 2024. That measure is not the same as lawful immigration, Seis eligibility, or customer demand, and should not be used as a customer forecast. It does show how quickly one visible part of the migration environment changed.[14]
The business also carried the fixed complexity of consumer fintech. Seis had relationships with Thread Bank, Unit, Lead Bank, and Lithic across deposits, debit, infrastructure, and credit. Revenue depended on subscription and card activity, while compliance, customer support, fraud operations, and partner management continued even as acquisition weakened. The public record does not show whether losses, bank terms, credit results, or fundraising caused the closure, so those factors should remain open questions.
The orderly wind-down is part of the record. Management said it would take months to close correctly for customers and bank partners. MAJORITY then offered an opt-in transfer that used a Seis-linked phone number and temporary password, with a new digital card available while a physical one shipped. Seis did not sell the whole company; it helped move customers to a surviving alternative.[5][6]
The core lesson is narrower than “immigrant banking does not work.” Seis proved that culturally specific banking could earn trust, referrals, and meaningful revenue. It also showed the danger of basing a large fixed operation on a customer-acquisition stream driven by public policy and migration timing. A rebuild should sell the onboarding and support system to institutions with existing balance sheets and local distribution instead of operating another national neobank.